By Brigitte L. Nacos
My previous post focused entirely on the joint air strikes against ISIS in Syria and possible follow-up military actions. But military responses from the air and on the ground will not entirely change the conditions in which terrorist guerrillas like ISIS operate and commit their atrocities—not in Syria and not in Iraq or elsewhere. For this, far-reaching political changes would be needed; and these will not be easily achieved.
Of the two states in which ISIS controls large territories, Iraq is better situated for defeating ISIS and perhaps start to work towards a political compromise that accommodates the rights of its various religious and ethnic population groups.
To begin with, the military push against ISIS in Iraq has made for strange bedfellows in that both the United States and Iran are militarily involved in the fight against ISIS. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani said yesterday according to the New York Times, “Had it not been for Iran’s efforts to rush military advisers and weaponry to Iraq three months ago, the radical group ‘would be residing in southern Baghdad’ today.” He actually chided the U.S. for not sooner moving against ISIS in Iraq. While both Tehran and Washington deny coordination between their military “advisors,” they nevertheless fight both against ISIS.
Shiites and Kurds depend on and want assistance by the Iranian and American military, but Sunnis are suspicious that Iraq’s Shiite dominated government in concert with Tehran and Washington fights not merely ISIS, Sunni extremists, but Iraq’s Sunni majority population. These sentiments on the part of Sunnis are understandable. After Sunni tribal leaders and their men joined the U.S. military in fighting and defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the predecessor of ISIS, Sunnis were denied equitable representation in the Bagdad government and some of their political leaders persecuted by the al-Maliki regime.
A first step towards reconciliation would be if Iraq’s new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi puts together a new government in which Kurds, Shiites, and the Sunni majority are fairly represented. Only then would there a chance, not certainty, that Sunnis again join the fight against terrorists, this time ISIS, as they fought AQI side by side with Americans in the Anbar Awakening.
But ultimately, Iraq may only be held together as a state with its current borders if Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis agree on forming a federal system with a significant degree of autonomy to the three states under the umbrella of a joint federal government. This, of course, would take the particular cooperation of Iran that supports fellow-Shiites and Turkey that does not want Kurds to move towards statehood.
Syria is an even more difficult problem, and not only because the major regional actors differ sharply on their positions vis-à-vis the al-Assad regime. While Iran supports the regime, Sunni majority countries overwhelmingly want is overthrown. There is agreement that ISIS and al-Nusra must be defeated. But whereas the U.S. and its Arab allies want to prop up the Free Syrian Army, Iran considers the latter to be a terrorist group.
Leaving the Free Syrian Army aside, since it is not a factor now, if ever, weakening or defeating the two major terrorist entities on Syrian soil would create an opportunity for Assad to regain control over the country and continue his own brand of repression and violence.
It should also be noted that ISIS, al-Nusra, and al-Nusra's affiliate Korason share regional and even global ambitions and pose terrorist threats far beyond Syria, whereas the Assad regime’s interest lies mostly within Syria. In other words, Assad is not a threat to the U.S., other Western countries, and most of his neighbors.
Perhaps along the road the notion of lesser evil versus greater evil will enter into the difficult discussions about the most prudent road map for dealing with the multiple problems in Syria.
Three successive US presidents made a commitment to the Iraqi people. Then the fourth US President, President Obama, broke the commitment in order to "end the war" and dishonored us.
One, as Senator McCain referred to in the 2008 presidential election, there's a reason the US military has remained in Europe and Asia long past WW2. Obama should have negotiated the next SOFA with Iraq in 2010-2011, which was doable, and should not have prematurely removed the US military presence from Iraq. We were necessary for the continued development of a pluralistic liberalized post-Saddam Iraq that could be our strategic partner as a force for moderation in the region. The US military presence in Iraq was more than a necessary security presence. As in Europe and Asia, we were a vital political presence. Once our organic factor was removed from Iraq's progression, it regressed, which was a mortal combination with events in Syria.
Two, Obama should have deployed the US military to intervene in Iraq many months, even a year-plus ago, when terrorist incursions from Syria to Iraq were rising but not yet critical.
Three, Obama's policy for regime change coupled with his opposition to peace operations, most stark with Libya, has been a disaster. That must change.
The US was in firm, hard-earned position to build the peace with Iraq and we were doing so consistent with our standing as leader of the free world. After Obama erroneously ended the peace mission, the US was still in position later to protect Iraq and perhaps return to building the peace.
It remains to be seen whether at this point President Obama irreversibly burned too many of the bridges to the peace that we had built with Iraq under President Bush.
Whether he has or not, Obama's priority is the proximate challenge of defeating and neutralizing the enemy, whatever that takes.
Looking ahead, this time around, the President - Obama and his successors - must restore a rigorous leadership commitment to building the peace on par with President Bush's commitment to peace. Again, it remains to be seen whether it's even possible to rebuild the bridges to the peace that Obama has burned.
What can you do about it, Professor?
Cure the corrupted social political dialogue around the Iraq mission.
The proper understanding and sustained support of the American people are necessary to restore President Bush's level of commitment to peace-building to American leadership. To that end, you and other subject-expert pundits should endeavor to set the record straight in the public zeitgeist that Operation Iraqi Freedom was, in fact, right on the law and justified on the policy. (The primary sources of the 1991-2003 Gulf War ceasefire clearly show that President Bush correctly followed the enforcement procedure with Saddam.)
The law, policy, and procedure of the 1991-2003 Gulf War ceasefire enforcement and 2003-2011 post-Saddam peace operations - ie, Operation Iraqi Freedom - were paradigmatic of liberal American leadership of the free world. As such, if OIF was wrong, then American leadership is wrong. But OIF was not wrong. OIF was right.
In order to restore American commitment to the liberal peace, you should explain to the American people that we were right in the first place to enforce the Gulf War ceasefire mandates with Saddam and build the peace with post-Saddam Iraq, and thus, we are in the right to win the war and build the peace moving forward.
Posted by: Eric | September 28, 2014 at 10:06 AM