By Brigitte L. Nacos
Nobody should have been terribly surprised, when a popular uprising rocked Tunisia driving President Ben Ali after nearly half-a-century of authoritarian rule out of office and out of the country. And nobody should have been terribly surprised that the revolutionary virus spread rapidly beyond Tunisia’s borders. Underneath the surface of stability, repressive regimes in the region were like powder kegs ready to explode.
The fall of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak that will come sooner rather than later, the firing of Jordan’s government by King Abdullah II; the promises by Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh, not to stand for reelection and by the Palestinian Authority, to hold local elections as soon as possible; a Facebook initiative calling for protests in Syria’s capital Damascus for later this week may well be followed by more dramatic happenings. Even the Emir of Qatar, the benefactor of Qatar-based Al Jazeera, cancelled his trip to South America because of the rapidly unfolding developments in his neighborhood.
As today’s images of violent clashes between pro- and anti-Mubarak factions in the streets of Cairo showed, Mubarak made an ill-advised effort to show Egyptians that the choice was between "stability and chaos," as he put it—he standing for stability, the popular uprising for chaos. But it was only after pro-Mubarak demonstrators were unleashed that the by and large peaceful demonstrations turned into bloody violence.
The turmoil in Egypt is the result of Mubarak’s refusal to heed the calls for democratization for many years. Instead of opening the system to participatory democracy, he is responsible for the popular uprising.
This much is clear: Today’s Egypt and today’s Middle East are very different from what this country and this region were a few weeks ago.
But nobody knows what is in the cards for Egypt and other Arab states.
Some neo-conservatives have criticized the Obama administration and presumably other Western governments that walked a fine line between the demonstrators and the dependable ally in the presidential palace for not supporting Mubarak; others were critical of Obama and other Western leaders for not siding categorically with those who called for democratic rights.
I think that the president and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton handled the situation as well as they could.
The fact is that Arabs and Muslims resent American and Western interference in their countries; they do not want to be told what to do and what not.
Nor would it be prudent to drop a reliable ally, whatever his domestic record, like a hot potato without regard for other helpful authoritarian regimes.
In diplomacy, realpolitik often trumps ideals and principles.
Having said this, at this point it is inconceivable to support Mubarak in any way. Although there is much reason to worry about what will come after Mubarak. And what will come after Yemen’s Saleh, Tunisia’s Ali, and what after elections in the West Bank and reforms in Jordan.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is best situated to become the most formidable player. Like Hamas, the Palestinian version of the Brotherhood and Hezbollah, Iran’s creation, the Brotherhood has endeared itself by providing social services that people cannot get from their governments.
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest and most influential Islamist movement and was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in opposition to the British-backed monarchy. In the mid-twentieth century, the Brotherhood expanded throughout the Arab world and took root in countries such as Algeria, Libya, the Palestinian territories, Sudan, Syria, and Tunis. Officially, the Brotherhood has claimed to oppose violence but it makes an exception for Palestinians in their fight against Israelis. In reality, however, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and affiliates elsewhere resorted to terrorist means in various settings and situations. As the 9/11 Commission Report noted, “In some countries, its [the Brotherhood’s] oppositional role is nonviolent; in others, especially Egypt, it has alternated between violent and nonviolent struggle with the regime.” In some instances, the most violent elements formed their own units within the Brotherhood; in other cases, they established separate and more extremist groups.
I have heard the argument that the Brotherhood would not steer an Islamist course if in power. But who knows?
The Brotherhood has made no secret that it wants to revoke Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel.
The possibility of the Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt and perhaps elsewhere gaining ground, say in Jordan and/or Syria, is certainly a nightmare scenario for Israel and for those who work and hope for peace between Israelis and Palestinians in the framework of a two-state solution.
And then there is Iran likely to gain without Egypt as a counterforce in the region.
(Much more will have to be pondered, said, and written on the current developments in the Arab worlds and their consequences.)
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