By Brigitte L. Nacos
In a clear-eyed, book-length assessment of the Bush-Cheney administration’s post-9/11 counterterrorism policy one of the foremost security experts who has spent a lot of time studying homeland securitym, Stephen Flynn, wrote a few years ago, “What was initially advertised as a two-front effort quickly became a lopsided strategy in which protecting our homeland has been neglected while the vast majority of our resources and political capital have been expanded in ‘taking the battle to the enemy.’” But the idea of fighting terrorists abroad so that they cannot hit us at home was flawed from the start. Flynn was right in the past and he is right today, when he concluded, “Despite all the rhetoric since September 11, 2001, and some new federal spending on homeland security, America remains unprepared to prevent and respond to acts of catastrophic terrorism on U.S. soil.”
In short, what the state of affairs through G.W. Bush’s presidency was—and is now—comes down to homeland insecurity rather than security. Former Vice President Dick Cheney can boast all he wants that on his watch no further attacks in the homeland occurred after 9/11, but the frightening growth of the global leaderless jihad was fueled during and by America’s so-called “war against terrorism.” The record number of foiled attacks by home-grown jihadis in 2009, the bloody strike by an Army doctor at Fort Hood last November, and the failed bombing of Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day proved Stephen Flynn’s prediction right, namely, that in spite of the wars we fight abroad, “terrorists can still come here—and, worse yet, are being made here.”
While the Obama administration inherited this flawed counterterrorism policy, it is now high time for the president to recognize that he cannot follow the same path as his predecessor. Not at home and not abroad. Today’s meeting with members of the National Security Council must be the mere prelude to a comprehensive reassessment of homeland security and the adoption of more realistic and more effective policy priorities.
To be sure, the immediate focus will be on the multiple mistakes made by security agencies and personnel in Washington and abroad in the case of the would-be underwear bomber I wrote about earlier. We know now that the British government did share the name of the young Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the with U.S. agencies after they denied him entrance into the United Kingdom. Another clue that was missed by the intelligence community! Intelligence about the Fort Hood shooter, too, was not acted upon.
Obviously, the creation of the office of a director of national security and the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center after 9/11, both charged with coordinating intelligence for the sake of effective counterterrorism, did not overcome the traditional lack of intelligence-sharing by and the turf fights between the multitude of intelligence agencies. This must change. And it must change now.
Recent Comments