By Brigitte L. Nacos
Recently, when former Vice President Richard Cheney attacked
President Barack Obama for “dithering” over a new strategy for the war in
The problem is that nobody can be sure “what it takes to
win” in
There are no encouraging answers as long as the U.S. and
NATO are dealing President Hamid Karzai’s regime or a similarly unreliable and
corrupt one and as long as the CIA continues to have Ahmed Karzai, the
president's brother and a suspected player in the country’s booming opium trade, on its
pay-roll as it has had since the beginning of the war eight years ago.
No wonder that Spencer Ackerman of the Washington
Independent
writes, “At this point, everything about the U.S. policy toward the Afghan
drug trade — from tolerance to eradication during the Bush administration to an
evolving approach to cultivating alternatives — now ought to be questioned….CIA
money funds a politically connected drug dealer. Opium funds the Taliban. We
are in
And then there is the news that the defense bill President
Obama signed into law this week contains the authorization to pay Taliban
fighters to renounce and quit the insurgency.
The record on buying the support of Afghan war lords and
their fighters did not work well at the beginning of the war shortly after
9/11. While open to the dollar bonanza at the time and seemingly helpful to
American forces, when push came to shove the leading Al-Qaeda and Taliban figures managed to flee
into Pakistan—hardly without the assistance of some of those war lords.
On today’s “Morning Joe” show, Lawrence O’Donnell, an MSNBC
analyst who is more knowledgeable and thoughtful than most of television’s
talking heads, made a remarkably candid statement with respect to
Nobody, including General Stanley McCrystal who has
requested at least 40,000 more
As Bob Woodward, who broke the memo story in the Washington Post, put it, “McChrystal
makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a
strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing
insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: "[I]nadequate
resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the
mission should not be resourced."
But as the Soviet’s learned in the 1990s, even a combination
of stick and carrot—and mostly carrot—does not work in
Matthew P. Hoh, an American military veteran who was the top
civilian officer in Zabul Province, and recently resigned from his post, gave a
bland and worrisome summary of America’s failing strategy in Afghanistan in his
resignation
letter. Most importantly, he wrote, “I have observed that the bulk of the
insurgency fights on for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against
the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative
government in
So, if the presence of military forces strengthens the
insurgency, what are the other choices? Can anything be achieved without
military force?
If you aren’t familiar with or don’t remember details from
the fascinating book “Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s
Not surprisingly, Kristoff argues, “instead of sending
40,000 troops more to
I know that many so-called realists consider such
suggestions utopian and idealistic without utility in real life.
I actually think that that Vice President Biden’s position—no additional troops and a focus on fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban most of all in their strongholds in Pakistan on the one hand--and substantial financial support for initiatives to build schools and training facilities and roads and bridges rather than trying to buying Taliban fighters and drug lords on the other hand may be a more promising road than beefing up the military presence and thereby the pro-insurgency sentiments.
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Posted by: Linda31wE | January 05, 2010 at 11:25 PM
Professor Nacos,
I recommend this article - http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/11/the_big_impact_of_small_footprints - via the excellent if irreverent COIN-emphasis blog http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama (also recommended reading), which cites the FP article author Thomas Hegghammer as a subject matter expert.
I immediately thought of this post re the proposals by VP Biden and Kristof. I believe you might you like the article especially given that the FP article focuses upon the public perception implications of the alternative proposals re OEF.
Posted by: Eric Chen | November 15, 2009 at 04:41 PM
Professor Nacos,
My comment ended up in the wrong thread. Now copying it into the intended thread ...
"The problem is that nobody can be sure “what it takes to win” in Afghanistan."
I agree.
Did the Soviets try Petraeus-style COIN? "Pro-insurgency sentiment" about our military presence will largely depend on the perception of tangible benefits from our military to the Afghanis and their community. As such, the COIN peace-building strategy for Afghanistan is meant to employ our soldiers in a manner that encourages Afghanis to make rational choices that favor our goals, in part by creating an environment conducive for GOs, NGOs, and IOs.
Kristof's notion that NGOs can replace the military in Afghanistan is enticing but his cite of CARE reminds me of the CARE aid worker in Iraq, Margaret Hassan. I wonder if CARE agrees with Kristof that their efforts would be helped by removing the US/NATO SASO mission from Afghanistan:
http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/20050505_ansocare.pdf
Kristof seems to imply NGO initiatives would be sustained, even improve, without a controlling Western presence on the ground. Maybe. But at that point, the NGOs would be working at the pleasure of whatever force dominates Afghanistan after we abandon the country. It seems you differ with Kristof about the Taliban. You don't trust them, whereas based on his use of the schools they haven't blown up as evidence, he seems to prefer the Taliban over US/NATO forces as the chief security provider in Afghanistan (which is realist, not liberal). If that's not the case, and Kristof actually believes NGOs can defeat the extremists, I recall a 2007 peace operations conference at SIPA (which, if memory serves, you also attended) where a USAID rep said in substance, if the military expects a follow-on civilian force, don’t, it’s not coming. At the same event, a UN rep said she feared a US "regime change" from the Bush admin to a presidential admin opting for withdrawal would be the death of on-going international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Finally, as far as “Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace…One School at a Time,” I wonder if Mortensen believes his efforts are incompatible with the COIN proponents' call for more troops. From http://www.gregmortenson.com/biography/ :
Three Cups of Tea is required reading for U.S. senior military commanders, for officers in the Norwegian War College, Forsvarsnett, for U.S. Special Forces deploying to Afghanistan, Pentagon officers in counter-insurgency training, and Canadian Defense Ministry members.
The book has been read by General David Petraeus – CENTCOM Commander, Admiral Mike Mullen – Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, and Admiral Eric Olson – SOCOM Special Forces commander, and several other U.S. military commanders who advocate for building relationships as a part of an overall strategic plan for peace. Mortenson has addressed the National Defense Senior Leadership Conference at the Pentagon, visited over two dozen military bases, NORAD, and been to the Air Force, Naval and West Point Academies.
Posted by: Eric Chen | November 11, 2009 at 11:50 AM