What Does It Take to Win in Afghanistan?

By Brigitte L. Nacos

Recently, when former Vice President Richard Cheney attacked President Barack Obama for “dithering” over a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan, he urged him to “do what it takes to win.”

The problem is that nobody can be sure “what it takes to win” in Afghanistan. Worse yet, nobody seems sure what “winning” and “succeeding” means in this context. Neutralizing Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders that hide in Pakistan’s mountainous tribal areas—not in Afghanistan? Installing a non-corrupt government in Kabul that wins over leaders in the fragmented country?

There are no encouraging answers as long as the U.S. and NATO are dealing President Hamid Karzai’s regime or a similarly unreliable and corrupt one and as long as the CIA continues to have Ahmed Karzai, the president's brother and a suspected player in the country’s booming opium trade, on its pay-roll as it has had since the beginning of the war eight years ago.

No wonder that Spencer Ackerman of the Washington Independent writes, “At this point, everything about the U.S. policy toward the Afghan drug trade — from tolerance to eradication during the Bush administration to an evolving approach to cultivating alternatives — now ought to be questioned….CIA money funds a politically connected drug dealer. Opium funds the Taliban. We are in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban. How much CIA money has indirectly funded the Taliban?”

And then there is the news that the defense bill President Obama signed into law this week contains the authorization to pay Taliban fighters to renounce and quit the insurgency.

The record on buying the support of Afghan war lords and their fighters did not work well at the beginning of the war shortly after 9/11. While open to the dollar bonanza at the time and seemingly helpful to American forces, when push came to shove the leading  Al-Qaeda and Taliban figures managed to flee into Pakistan—hardly without the assistance of some of those war lords.

On today’s “Morning Joe” show, Lawrence O’Donnell, an MSNBC analyst who is more knowledgeable and thoughtful than most of television’s talking heads, made a remarkably candid statement with respect to Afghanistan. “I don’t know what to do next,” he said. And O’Donnell, for sure, is familiar with the various options that President Obama and his national security advisers are considering.

Nobody, including General Stanley McCrystal who has requested at least 40,000 more U.S. troops and additional forces from European NATO allies, argues that military might alone has a chance to succeed in Afghanistan.  You may want to read the general’s 66-page, leaked memo on this count.

As Bob Woodward, who broke the memo story in the Washington Post, put it, “McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: "[I]nadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced."

But as the Soviet’s learned in the 1990s, even a combination of stick and carrot—and mostly carrot—does not work in Afghanistan. As Victor Sebestyen writes in today’s New York Times, “Over the years, the Soviets changed their tactics frequently, but much of the time they were trying and failing to pacify the country’s problematic south and east, often conducting armed sweeps along the border with Pakistan, through which many of the guerrillas moved, as the Taliban do now.”

Matthew P. Hoh, an American military veteran who was the top civilian officer in Zabul Province, and recently resigned from his post, gave a bland and worrisome summary of America’s failing strategy in Afghanistan in his resignation letter. Most importantly, he wrote, “I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights on for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.” Furthermore, “The United States military presence in Afghanistan greatly contributes to the legitimacy and strategic message of the Pashtun insurgency. “

So, if the presence of military forces strengthens the insurgency, what are the other choices? Can anything be achieved without military force?

If you aren’t familiar with or don’t remember details from the fascinating book “Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace…One School at a Time,” take a few hours to read or reread the volume. I did a little while ago and was reminded this morning by Nicholas Kristoff of the accomplishments of one man’s incredible peace mission. As Kristoff writes in his column, "Greg Mortenson, author of “Three Cups of Tea,” has now build 39 schools in Afghanistan and 92 in Pakistan — and not one has been burned down or closed. The aid organization CARE has 295 schools educating 50,000 girls in Afghanistan, and not a single one has been closed or burned by the Taliban. The Afghan Institute of Learning, another aid group, has 32 schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with none closed by the Taliban (although local communities have temporarily suspended three for security reasons)."

Not surprisingly, Kristoff argues, “instead of sending 40,000 troops more to Afghanistan, how about opening 40,000 schools?”

I know that many so-called realists consider such suggestions utopian and idealistic without utility in real life.

I actually think that that Vice President Biden’s position—no additional troops and a focus on fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban most of all in their strongholds in Pakistan on the one hand--and substantial financial support for initiatives to build schools and training facilities and roads and bridges rather than trying to buying Taliban fighters and drug lords on the other hand may be a more promising road than beefing up the military presence and thereby the pro-insurgency sentiments.  

Comments

[Linda31wE]

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[Eric Chen]

Professor Nacos,

I recommend this article - http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/11/the_big_impact_of_small_footprints - via the excellent if irreverent COIN-emphasis blog http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama (also recommended reading), which cites the FP article author Thomas Hegghammer as a subject matter expert.

I immediately thought of this post re the proposals by VP Biden and Kristof. I believe you might you like the article especially given that the FP article focuses upon the public perception implications of the alternative proposals re OEF.

[Eric Chen]

Professor Nacos,

My comment ended up in the wrong thread. Now copying it into the intended thread ...

"The problem is that nobody can be sure “what it takes to win” in Afghanistan."

I agree.

Did the Soviets try Petraeus-style COIN? "Pro-insurgency sentiment" about our military presence will largely depend on the perception of tangible benefits from our military to the Afghanis and their community. As such, the COIN peace-building strategy for Afghanistan is meant to employ our soldiers in a manner that encourages Afghanis to make rational choices that favor our goals, in part by creating an environment conducive for GOs, NGOs, and IOs.

Kristof's notion that NGOs can replace the military in Afghanistan is enticing but his cite of CARE reminds me of the CARE aid worker in Iraq, Margaret Hassan. I wonder if CARE agrees with Kristof that their efforts would be helped by removing the US/NATO SASO mission from Afghanistan:

http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/20050505_ansocare.pdf

Kristof seems to imply NGO initiatives would be sustained, even improve, without a controlling Western presence on the ground. Maybe. But at that point, the NGOs would be working at the pleasure of whatever force dominates Afghanistan after we abandon the country. It seems you differ with Kristof about the Taliban. You don't trust them, whereas based on his use of the schools they haven't blown up as evidence, he seems to prefer the Taliban over US/NATO forces as the chief security provider in Afghanistan (which is realist, not liberal). If that's not the case, and Kristof actually believes NGOs can defeat the extremists, I recall a 2007 peace operations conference at SIPA (which, if memory serves, you also attended) where a USAID rep said in substance, if the military expects a follow-on civilian force, don’t, it’s not coming. At the same event, a UN rep said she feared a US "regime change" from the Bush admin to a presidential admin opting for withdrawal would be the death of on-going international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Finally, as far as “Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace…One School at a Time,” I wonder if Mortensen believes his efforts are incompatible with the COIN proponents' call for more troops. From http://www.gregmortenson.com/biography/ :

Three Cups of Tea is required reading for U.S. senior military commanders, for officers in the Norwegian War College, Forsvarsnett, for U.S. Special Forces deploying to Afghanistan, Pentagon officers in counter-insurgency training, and Canadian Defense Ministry members.

The book has been read by General David Petraeus – CENTCOM Commander, Admiral Mike Mullen – Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, and Admiral Eric Olson – SOCOM Special Forces commander, and several other U.S. military commanders who advocate for building relationships as a part of an overall strategic plan for peace. Mortenson has addressed the National Defense Senior Leadership Conference at the Pentagon, visited over two dozen military bases, NORAD, and been to the Air Force, Naval and West Point Academies.