By Brigitte L. Nacos
Robert Gates, the present and future U.S. Secretary of Defense, writes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs that “military force will continue to play a role” in the struggle against terrorists but that the “United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” The same holds true for Israel. Just as Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah did not weaken the Lebanese group, the current military conflict in Gaza will not weaken Hamas nor the organization’s will and ability to fight on.
States that are faced with domestic or transnational terrorism will not and should not altogether exclude military options in form of air-strikes or commando raids against terrorist hide-outs, weapon depots, training facilities, or for the purpose of freeing hostages. But even if successful, such limited measures accomplish only modest objectives (i.e., the decimation of a group’s leadership, the rescue of hostages)--they are not likely to end terrorism or destroy terrorist organizations.
Typically, terrorists and insurgents hide among civilians in cities, towns, or villages. In such situations, even limited military operations are likely to result in collateral damage. One tragic example of high risk offensive actions was an August 2008 ground operation by U.S. Special Operation Forces backed by air strikes in the Afghan village of Azizabad, When the dust settled, more than 90 civilians—most of them women and children—were dead along with three dozen or so insurgents. The damage to America’s reputation in this Afghan village, in all of Afghanistan, and in the international community was far greater than the benefit of eliminating a few terrorists or insurgents. Military actions, especially when they involve the death of innocent bystanders, tend to rally supporters and recruit new ones. The mentioned commando operation and surgical strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan were followed by a surge in violence by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The scope and risk of missile strikes and commando operations in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan by the U.S. military pale in comparison to the Israel’s use of military force against Hezbollah in 2006 and now against Hamas in the Gaza Strip; the same is, tragically, also true with respect to the large number of innocent civilian victims. The outcry against Israel in generally hostile and friendly countries is fueled by the unspeakable “collateral damage” inflicted on the civilian population of Gaza. Ignored by the audiences of such conflicts is the fact that terrorists, by cowardly operating in the midst of civilians, put the lives of innocents at risk in the first place. But in the age of mass-mediated politics, perception trumps reality.
A recent study of all terrorist groups that were active around the world from 1968 through 2006 found that only 7% ended because of military force, 40% because of policing, 10% because they realized their typically very limited objectives. Most importantly, 43% of all these organizations terminated their violence because of political solutions or settlements.
The lesson for terrorist organizations is that the likelihood of achieving their ultimate objectives by continuing their violence is very slim, that there is a far better chance to negotiate a settlement and participate non-violently in the political process.
The lesson for the targets of terrorism is equally telling: Not hard power (whether in form of military action or economic sanctions/blockades) but rather soft power (political solutions) is most likely to ultimately prevail against terrorist organizations.
To be sure, Hamas can inflict pain on Israelis by hurling rockets or sending suicide bombers. And Israel can inflict pain on Hamas by killing its leaders and operatives. But neither Hamas nor Israel will realize the ultimate objectives by terrorist attacks and all out military force.
Thus, both sides should agree to a cease fire now followed-up by swift international measures that prevent Hamas from launching missiles against Israeli targets and from smuggling military hardware and money into Gaza.
Israel, in turn, must end its blockade of Gaza and allow the free flow of food and other supply shipments into the Gaza Strip.
Finally, the incoming Obama administration must immediately launch and lead a new peace process with the goal of a two-state solution and enlist support in the international community. It will not be easy for President Back Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and, hopefully, a new special envoy to the region.
In his recent article, “Change They Can Believe In: To Make Israel Safe, Give Palestinians Their Due,” Walter Russell Mead provides food for thought on this.
The lesson we've learned in Iraq is that both hard and soft approaches must be integrated.
The way forward for us in the 21st century is to retire the obsolete, artificial, and counter-productive division between war-fighting and peace-building. The goals of cooperative strategies and actively building peace to prevent war, winning wars, and building peace in the post-war are in the same continuum.
Posted by: Eric Chen | January 14, 2009 at 11:35 PM
Eric: Your posts are always though-provoking. To be sure, when it comes to hard and soft power it is not either--or. That's precisely why I started out with Mr. Gates' quote and emphasized that no government can preclude hard power measures, whether military or economic.
But both the recent past in Iraq and the current situation in Gaza and similar conflicts in the region have demonstrated that even the superior military force cannot succeed all the time--see also the Israel-Hamas confrontation in 2006.
Yes, it is remarkable that Secretary of Defense is pressing for more soft power. Sometimes, soft power can prevent or solve armed conflicts, at other times both approaches may be needed.
Posted by: Brigitte | January 11, 2009 at 04:54 PM
It's not either/or.
At present, our military is the chief agent of both soft and hard power due to the simple fact that a requirement for applying soft power is security, which requires hard power. Most traditional soft power agents flee 'non-permissive' environments such as they did in Iraq once the enemy realizes they're a threat (eg, so beheading) or profitable (eg, so kidnapping/ransom), and vulnerable.
What is a military of a liberal nation to do when everyone else abandons the same people they had pledged to help? Our soldiers have adapted by becoming both hard and soft power agents. Functionally, they have been warfighters, police, diplomats, humanitarian aid workers, liaisons, and nation-builders. Each would be a full-time and complex responsibilty in a peaceful english-speaking Western society, let alone a damaged and dangerous foreign society.
I'm sure the military, like any of us, would much rather do one job rather than the full-spectrum it's doing now, but until traditional soft power agents develop more robust capabilities and staying power in 'non-permissive' environments, then either our military will continue to be (forced to be) a combined hard/soft power force or soft power agents will need to rely more extensively on private military contractors.
Does the Israel military have the capability to achieve what our military has been achieving in terms of hard and soft power in Iraq? Of course, from the start, many more Iraqis welcomed and were willing to work with Americans against a regime they hated. I'm not sure the Israel military would have the same organic advantages in Gaza that our military had from the start, and nearly squandered before the 'surge', in Iraq.
Posted by: Eric Chen | January 11, 2009 at 01:44 PM
When an implacable enemy such as Hamas declares its intended goal to be total destruction of the other side, "humanitarian" considerations and "world public opinion" are beside the point -- especially if there is a reasonable chance to utterly destroy the Hamas leadership. The parallel with Hizbollah is specious. Israel cannot conquer all of Lebanon where Hizbollah can hide. Hamas has nowhere to go. My analogy with Hitler is germane here -- only total destruction of the other side militarily, despite the civilian casualties (how many "innocent" Germans dies in the Allied invasion of Germany? A huge number!) can ensure Israel's long term survival. This time, Israel is thinking strategically, not tactically. One final point, as you note -- the civilians in Gaza voted for Hamas, i.e. they too support total destruction of Israel. So how "innocent" can they be? Were the German civilians who "merely" voted for the Nazi party and tacitly supported Hitler, "innocent"? Of course not! So why are the Gazans different?
Posted by: Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig | January 09, 2009 at 02:02 PM
Professor, sure, Hamas is both terrorist a organization and a party that won in the elections that, unfortunately, the U.S. and others pushed for. But for all practical purposes, Hamas and Hezbollah (also a party represented in the Lebanese parliament and cabinet)use political violence to advance their political objectives within their own polities and against Israel--and those of their sponsor, Iran.
But just as Hezbollah was not defeated in 2006, Hamas will not be defeated now. If the IDF were to engage in urban warfare (exactly what Hamas wants in gross disregard for the Palestinian civilian population), many, many more Palestinian civilians would be killed.This would further diminish support for Israel around the world. At the same time, sympathies for Hamas among Palestinians and others in the neighborhood would increase significantly as would the number of new recruits.Last but not least,urban warfare would result in a large number of casualties and fatalities among Israeli Defense Forces.
This is not a question of what is just and right. When missiles are targeting citizens, governments have the right and the duty to go after the perpetrators. Israel has done that and is still fighting to destroy the remaining launching sites and rockets.
As I wrote, a cease fire must guarantee via an international peace keeping entity or whatever means that Hamas can no longer attack Israel with missiles and does no longer receive Iranian arms and other supplies.
Charles Krauthammer argued on Fox News and today in the Washington Post, namely that Israel can win the end-game now--militarily--and drive Hamas from power.
I don't think so.
Posted by: Brigitte | January 09, 2009 at 01:05 PM
In theory, correct. However, the Hamas case is different than almost all others for the following reasons:
1) Hamas is a terrorist organization that also runs a government, and has full control over a territorial area. Thus, it has resources well beyond what terrorist organizations normally have.
2) Hamas's goal is not "limited" but rather the total annihilation of another country. For Hamas, this goal is non-negotiable because it is based on theological belief and not on "practical" or "utilitarian" considerations.
3) Hamas is a terrorist organization with strong support (resources and in its goals) from a strong country -- Iran -- so that its political support, resources, and goals are not merely "indigenous" but are reinforced from the outside.
Thus, overall "soft power" is not relevant in such circumstances. Would the same suggestion have been used vis-a-vis Hitler? Hamas and Hitler are different only in the (current) resources at their disposal, not in their goals or tactics.
Posted by: Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig | January 09, 2009 at 11:10 AM