Al-Qaeda is Not the New Superpower: Terrorists Win When We Allow Them to Win

By Brigitte L. Nacos
Judging from the news (especially on the all news cable networks) of the failed attempt to drive a burning jeep into the terminal building of Glasgow airport and what was reported as foiled plots to explode two cars in the midst of London, al-Qaeda is the world’s new superpower. Public officials in the United Kingdom contributed to this perception. As Mary Jordan and Craig Whitlock report in the Washington Post, Britain’s new Prime Minister Gordon Brown told his nation that it is “clear that we are dealing, in general terms, with people who are associated with al-Qaeda." He warned furthermore, "It's obvious that we have a group of people -- not just in this country, but around the world -- who're prepared at any time to inflict what they want to be maximum damage on civilians, irrespective of the religion of these people who are killed or maimed.” According to an Associated Press report, Brown’s terrorism advisor, Lord Stevens, added that “Al-Qaida has imported the tactics of Baghdad and Bali to the streets of the UK.” On his No Quarter blog, terrorism expert Larry Johnson writes, “As events unfold I'm simply asking that folks take a big deep breath and try to keep things in perspective. Are there jihadist extremists in the world who are willing to kill innocents?  Absolutely. Are they amenable to negotiation? No.  I am not in the, ‘have you hugged a terrorist today’ camp. However, we need to stop equating their hatred with actual capability.”  Instead, public officials and the media hype the terrorist threat. And presidential candidate Rudy Giuliani was the first of the contenders trying to score political points off the events in the U.K, when he said in New Orleans, “The car bomb scare in London and the attack Saturday at the Glasgow airport underscore the need for a strong immigration policy in the United States.”
    Public officials and the news media have an obligation to inform and educate the public about the calculus of terrorism so that citizens understand the scheme of political violence in which the psychological impact on target societies surpasses the number of people killed and injured. Every person that is killed in a terrorist event means a tragic, utterly unnecessary loss. But we must also keep in mind that many more people die each year because of traffic accidents, crimes, cancer, heart attacks, and AIDS rather than in terrorist incidents. About 40,000 Americans are killed year in, year out in traffic accidents alone compared to about 3,000 persons who perished on 9/11 in the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Yet, the victims of diseases and accidents do not cause the widespread fear and depression that are common in the wake of major acts of terrorism. Target societies must become aware of these facts and realize that the psychological impact of terrorism is disproportionate to the likelihood that an individual will become a victim of terror strikes.

    The public has a right to know—even if the truth means to learn about the likelihood that terrorists, sooner or later, will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. But for the authorities to discuss possible horror scenarios makes sense only if they inform the public at the same time on the state of emergency preparedness in their communities. It is equally important that the public and private sectors tell the public what to do and what not to do in case of catastrophic terror.
    Overreaction undermines the moral fabric of a society that is victimized by terrorists and plays into the hands of terrorists. As we know now, the invasion and occupation of Iraq did not decrease the terrorist threat but increased it, if only by driving more recruits into the arms of Al Qaeda and like-minded groups.
    While terrorists can and do cause enormous harm and affect domestic and international politics and policies—at times significantly, few of them realize their ultimate objectives. Based on his comprehensive study of twenty-eight terrorist groups Max Abrahams found that these groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time.” Just as important, those groups “whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets failed to achieve their policy objectives regardless of their nature.” In other words, terrorism does not work!
    This does not mean, however, that extremists will stop trying. Terrorist groups come and go. Some are more durable than others. Whenever Al Qaeda and similar organizations and cells cease to exist, other groups will emerge. Yet, given the poor success rate of terrorism, there is no reason for gloom and doom.
    Terrorist Win Only, If We Allow Them To Win.

Comments

[Brigitte]

Zohar:
Thanks for the interesting comment. While I, too, have problems with Abrahams' methodology--I agree that historically most terrorists have failed to achieve their ultimate political goals. However, as you know and as I actually told Abrahams after his article was published, terrorists are very successful in getting attention, intimidate their target societies, and trigger over-reactions.
The mass media but also public officials must be careful of not magnifying the attention terrorists crave.
So, while terrorists have a poor track record in terms of their final political goals, they are very successful in winning their publicity related objectives.
In this respect--they win because we (public officials, media, and the public at large) allow them to win.

[PBH]

Rudy Giuliani or Vampire Ghouliani?

http://www.prosebeforehos.com/government_employee/06/19/rudy-giuliani-or-vampire/

[Zohar Kadmon Sella]

I was glad to find Abrahams's article online. It made very interesting points, and yet I found it problematic. It's true that when looked at from the perspective of the individual terrorist group, terrorism does seem to fail as a mean for political coercion. But I don't think this study can really substantiate its far reaching conclusion that terrorism "does not work."

First of all, it is not sufficiently sensitive to the fact that terrorism is a long term strategy. Terrorists achieve legitimacy through persistance and, for lack of a better term, reliability -- by simply doing what they threaten to do (Israelis experienced this last summer, when every warning issued by Hassan Nasrallah had consistently and painfully materialized). Abrahams seems to be somewhat caught in the notion that terrorism is inherently self-defeating because you can't delegitimize yourself through violence and at the same time seek immediate concessions from your target community. But defining terrorism in such paradoxical terms is to fail to acknowledge its complexities. Indeed, a single terrorist campaign is rarely "succesful," but this is not the point. Terrorism is first and foremost a way to achieve political visibility -- which is why I agree that we, the media, "let them win" -- and when such visibility combines with persistence and effective leadership, it eventually establishes political legitimacy. Terrorism can have, and does have, tremendous successes if only looked at from a historical perspective. To name the most symbolic example, terrorism didn't stand in the way of awarding Nelson Mandela or Yasser Arafat with the Nobel Peace Prize.

The 2001 terrorist group list that Abrahams studied may simply be too new to be seriously evaluated in terms of successes and failures. Because clearly, so many ethno-national conflicts of the 20th century had a terrorist component that had fueled them only in order to transform the perpetrators -- in the course of decades -- into a legitimate force.

I also disagree with Abrahams's claim that Palestinian terrorism "failed" because it hardened Israelis and diminished their support for territorial concessions. The facts speak for themselves: the disengagement from the Gaza Strip was a direct reaction to the second Intifada.