Facts and Truth Must Inform Counterterrorism

By Brigitte L. Nacos

In their analysis of the controversial National Intelligence Estimate in the Washington Post, Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus write, “In describing Iraq as "the 'cause celebre' for jihadists," the document judges that real and perceived insurgent successes there will "inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere," while losses would have the opposite effect.” While President Bush denied yesterday that the Iraq situation increased the threat of terrorism, the intelligence community drew obviously different conclusions. As Paul R. Pillar, former CIA national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, told the Post, “This [the problem pinpointed in the intelligence document] is very much mainstream stuff. There are no surprises."

 

It did not take former and present intelligence specialists and not a leaked and now partially released secret document to figure out that the invasion and occupation of Iraq have played predominant roles in the successful recruitment drives of self-described jihadists and the establishment of terrorist cells and groups in the Near East and in Europe Major terrorist attacks, like the ones in Madrid and London, were planned and executed in response to the Iraq War. We know that from the testaments of suicide bombers, from surviving terrorists, and from Internet communications among Arabs and Muslims in the radicalized milieu.

To deny that Iraq was and is the single most important reason for the growing number of terrorists is tantamount to denying the evidence. But without accepting facts and truth, we cannot solve problems. Policy-makers must be guided by facts not fiction—especially, when it comes to counterterrorism and decisions over life or death of Americans and people elsewhere.