By Brigitte L. Nacos
What happens to terrorist organizations or hate groups that incite political violence when their leaders die, are killed, put behind bars, or are driven into hiding places? More specifically, what are the likely consequences of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's death for terrorism in Iraq and elsewhere?
Strong leaders that control all aspects of their groups tend to be irreplaceable by hand-picked successors or winners in foughts for succession. You cut the head off and you successfully kill the beast. Thus, when Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas were driven into safe havens in the 1980s and lost control of their respective organizations, their Palestinian terrorist groups faded away. When William Pierce, hands-on leader of the White Supremacy/neo-Nazi National Alliance and inspirer of the Oklahoma City bomber, died, a fight for succession reduced his organization to a mere shadow of its former strength.
Contrary to hierarchically organized terrorist and hate groups, al-Zarqawi's Al Qaeda in Iraq is unlikely to suffer an existential blow after his death. To be sure, when al-Zarqawi was "neutralized," this was a symbolic victory for the U.S. But the idea that the demise of one of the most brutal terrorists was a decisive victory in the "war on terrorism," is as far-fetched as the suggestion that the caputure or death of bin Laden would be a fatal blow to his Al Qaeda. Since bin Laden and his alter ego al-Zawahiri were driven out of their headquarters in Afghanistan, they have been unable to exercise day-to-day control over whatever may be left of the original organization.
This does not mean less terrorism. Indeed, Al Qaeda is far
more dangerous as a unifying idea, an inspirational rallying point for
angry, incited, alienated men and women in the Muslim world and in the
West than it possibly could be as a traditional organization.
Whereas bin Laden's group trained recruits and lend financial and operational assistance to terrorists before 9/11, it evolved into a network of autonomous and leaderless cells on literally all continents. Some of these cells cooperate with each other from time to time, others do not. But they all are inspired by bin Laden and his anti-American, anti-Western message of hate, his call for jihad against "Crusaders and Zionists" and their allies. His death--especially if similar to al-Zarqawi's--would bolster the devotion to the "martyr" among his sympathizers.
The same is to be expected in the wake of al-Zarqawi's violent end. While his role as terror leader in Iraq was greatly exaggerated by his own communications, by the U.S. military's propaganda, and by the media, he did recruit many terrorists to operate in Iraq, where he masterminded the most devastating terror attacks and the most gruesome executions of hostages. Emboldened by the celebrity status--not the least manifested by the U.S. government's $25 million bounty on his head, al-Zarqawi made efforts to rival bin Laden as global motivator and recruiter.
In death and as "martyr" al-Zarqawi is likely to be more successful than in life to recruit newcomers into the terrorist cause--not only for missions in Iraq but for strikes elsewhere as well.
It does not matter who will succeed al-Zarqawi because leaderless cells will carry on.The speculations about a likely successor are pushed by the same circles that cast him into the role of the world's most dangerous terrorist. With bin Laden in hiding, the U.S. military and the media wanted another personification of terrorist evil. And al-Zarqawi fit the bill. The military wanted to turn Iraqis against the man who had indeed killed many innocent Iraqis; the news media prefered to focus on one celebrity terrorist rather than on complex webs of violent cells.
The lesson to be learned is clear: Do not create bigger than life terrorists. However hated by their victims, super-terrorists become recruiters-in-chief in life and probably far more so in death. Therefore, the death of AL-Zarqawi may well result in more terrorism, not less.
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