When Peace Negotiations Fail: Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan

By Brigitte L. Nacos
Reporting about talks between “intermediaries” and the Taliban as well as other militant factions in Afghanistan, Dexter Filkins wrote recently that these secret negotiations have taken place “for months,” “accelerated since Mr. Obama took office” and have been conducted with the blessing of the Kabul government and without opposition from Washington. Reportedly, the Taliban and other militants insist that the removal of U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan must be part of any peace deal, whereas the Obama administration demands that the Taliban disarms as precondition for negotiations. Imagine for a moment that the two sides would agree to each these conditions and come to a peace agreement.

You would have to believe in the fairy tale to expect that such an arrangement would work in the real world--certainly not as long as Taliban leader and bin Laden ally Mullah Muhammad Omar and his Afghan counterparts spread violence and terror in order to hold and expand their power positions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Officially, it is the goal of the Obama administration to win over “moderates” within the Taliban and thereby strengthen the support base for peaceful cooperation and legitimate participation in Afghan public affairs. But neither this official position nor the indirect talks with Taliban and other militant leaders promise any progress in the search for a peaceful solution in Afghanistan.

One does not have to look further than neighboring Pakistan for evidence. After all, it was the peace-agreement between the Pakistani Taliban and the provincial government of the North-West Frontier region of early 2009 and approved by the national parliament that led to civil war-like conditions, terrorism, and, most of all, a colossal humanitarian crisis. As part of the settlement, the army withdrew from the region. But although the agreement gave the Taliban the right to impose the most extreme form of sharia law and de facto control over the SWAT valley, the extremists did not lay down their arms as they had agreed to. Instead, they fought to expand their rule of terror into other regions of the country with the goal to take down the central government and bring their brand of religious rule to all of Pakistan. 

In short, the agreement that surrendered a whole province with a population of 1.5 million to the Taliban emboldened the extremists to mount a brutal offensive beyond the Swat region shortly after the “peace” deal was agreed to.

If a peace settlement in Afghanistan were to be worked out with the Taliban, one should expect a Pakistan-style debacle. Just like their friends in the Afghan Taliban that has hosted them since their flight from Afghanistan after 9/11 and just like Osama bin Laden and others in the Al Qaeda movement, the Taliban leaders and faithful followers will never abandon their ultimate objectives—in this case the rule over Afghanistan.   

As for separating “moderates” from hard-core extremists, this will not work either in these particular cases. Any sign of cooperating with the enemy, any sign of weakening allegiance to the extremist cause will result in brutal punishment of “collaborators.”

The lesson of the “peace” debacle in Pakistan, then, is clear. You cannot negotiate with fanatic group leaders who are perpetrating deadly terror attacks and willing to die for the sake of their extremist religious ideas. As the Pakistani government and military belatedly concluded, you must defeat them. Similarly, there will not be peace in Afghanistan with the Taliban intact and party to a peace deal—notwithstanding secret talks.   

Comments

[DHB]

I don’t think there can ever be any successful settlement negotiation with the Tailbans. This terrorist group has become a real nuisance for the whole mankind.